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anglais
This contribution aims at enriching the debate on the priority of unfunded pension
rights in the case of a sponsoring firm's bankruptcy. Starting from the idea that
pension promises in DB schemes are part of a financial contract between a sponsor
and participants to a sponsored pension plan, we argue that plan participants are
not ordinary creditors and should be given the same priority as other claimants in
the event of underfunding and a sponsoring firm's bankruptcy. We build up a model
consistent with this view, which gives room for more participants' involvement in
pension fund management. We assume that the sponsoring firm chooses the optimal
share of a pension fund deficit that it commits to cover in case of underfunding,
while participants choose the contribution rates that maximize their expected
utility. We show that two regimes govern the pattern of the relationship between
the optimal level of funding chosen by the sponsor and the optimal contribution
rates chosen by the plan participants. Allowing plan participants to determine their
desired contribution rates gives the entrepreneur the proper incentive for funding
the pension plan. In a certain way, our pension contract resembles a cash-balance
contract and our model suggests that more security can be given to plan
participants in their pension savings by offering them a cash-balance plan which
states a priority of unfunded pension rights in case of a firm's bankruptcy.
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